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1. Introduction 
Studies on the cotton industry proliferate. Remarkably, the cotton industry has 
figured in recent debates over the amplitude and significance of the British Industrial 
Revolution, the loss of British competitive advantage, and the wealth and the poverty of 
nations in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. As research moves forward, it 
seems obvious that the comparative history of European cotton industry in the period before 
the 'cotton famine' has been grossly neglected. There have been some splendid books and 
articles on some national cases but the comparative perspective has barely been touched. In 
particular, to date no study has systematically analyzed the cotton textile industry in the 
Mediterranean basin during the early industrialisation period. This chapter fills that gap by 
adopting a comparative perspective. More specifically, this chapter concentrates its energies 
on providing a careful analysis of the technological choices of four cotton industries: the two 
largest producers in the Mediterranean Basin and the two largest producers in the world, 
from 1830 to 1860. 
Before the arrival of the 'cotton famine' in the 1860s, the most important settlements 
of the modem cotton industry in the Mediterranean basin were in Catalonia (Spain) and in 
the Crown of Piedmont-Sardinia. 1 Simultaneously, the world leadership in cotton textiles was 
in the hands of Lancashire (Britain), while New England (United States) occupied the 
second position. In these regions, the cotton industry represented the first large-scale 
application of modem technology and the factory system. However, these four cotton 
industries differed strongly. In the beginnings, the new cotton mills followed the British 
model but in few years each country had developed its own practices and adapted the British 
technology to its own needs. Therefore, it seems that there is a strong case for placing 
primary stress on the cotton industry as the first example of how technological choice is 
influenced by local conditions. 
Few economic historians believed in the absolute tyranny of fixed factor proportions 
1 Specifically, in the regions of Piedmont and Ligury. 
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and fixed attribute bundles; that is, in the argument that the choice of technology is 
technologically detennined. Instead, the majority recognised that there exist a fairly wide 
range of alternative technology choices. However, economic historians vary in the reasons 
they stress. For Habakkuk. (1962) the choice of different technologies reflects differences in 
factor endowments. In particular, he argued that land abundance and labour scarcity in 
United States led to high relative wages and the substitution of capital for labour. Instead, 
for North (1981) institutions to technological change had crucial importance since their 
historical development will decide the outcome of any economic activity in a community. 
Institutions should be seen in tenns of cultural nonns, written rules and unwritten codes of 
conduct that provide the framework within economic agents function. Finally, David (1985) 
posits more emphasis on the path-dependence of technological choices. Divergence on 
technological choices has occurred, in this view, but not simply because of differences in 
factor endowments or institutions. Rather, the argument is that it exists a dependence of 
successive developments on prior events. Consequently, it seems that by focusing explicitly 
on technological choice, one can open the door to a deeper understanding of how prior 
history, institutions and factor prices could affect technological innovation and long-run 
growth. 
The recent literature on the history of cotton industry contains three broad 
perspectives as well. One maintains the unimportance of alternative technological choices 
in the cotton industry. In particular, Clark (1987) diminished the importance of alternative 
technology; thereby, he asserted that countries with different factor prices showed no 
evidence of any difference in cotton spinning techniques at the beginnings of the twentieth 
century. According to his view, the effort of workers was the major detenninant of the 
performance of cotton industries. A second view stresses that patterns of adoption of 
technology are basically consistent with a rational response to prevailing factor costs. For 
Von Tunzelmann (1978) technological choices of British, Belgian, and American 
manufacturers were constrained in the first place by the price they had to pay for energy. 
For example, he pointed out that in the United States the abundance of (cheap) water power 
was the incentive offered to develop a new technology more power-intensive (the ring 
throstle). For Saxonhouse and Wright (1984), the choice of technology was driven by 
geographical factors and the capacity to innovate. In particular, they argued that the 
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diffusion of ring spinning was constrained by the availability of high-quality cotton and 
subsequently by ingenuity in devising alternatives like cotton mixing. Instead, Harley (1992) 
considered implicitly a more large set of factors in his comparison between British and 
American cotton industries in the mid-nineteenth century. Thus, he included the relative 
prices of raw cotton, energy, skills and labour as determinants of the technology. A third 
interpretation posits a more fundamental role in institutional factors. Lazonick (1990) 
claimed the importance of entrepreneurial failures for the choice of technology. In particular, 
he censured the British entrepreneurs for their alleged failure to choose the correct 
techniques in spinning and weaving during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
According to his arguments, the fundamental error was retaining the horizontal specialization 
of the British industry into spinning and weaving factories. Similarly, Fisher (1991) 
emphasized the reluctance of Swiss textile entrepreneurs to adopt the new spInnmg 
machinery. He argued that these entrepreneurs 'were more risk avoiders than profit 
maximizers'.2 Finally, for Otsuka, Ranis and Saxonbouse (1988) differential technological 
performance between Japanese and Indian cotton industry emanated from differences in 
market structure and government intervention. They pointed out that in Japan the relative 
absence of market intervention policies helped both to ensure an efficient choice of imported 
technology and to have it adapted in appropriate directions. 
While I recognise the importance of institutional and cultural differentials across 
countries, my basic premise is that labourforce skills and factor endowments are of crucial 
significance to the choice of technology in cotton textiles. In the period before the 'cotton 
famine', alternative technological choices were relatively important. However, these 
technology alternatives cannot be interpreted without consideration heterogeneity of cotton 
cloth. In other words, to produce the different kinds of cotton cloth it was employed a 
particular amount of physical and human capital, labour, energy and raw cotton. Moreover, 
some types of machinery were more adept than others in the production of some kinds of 
cotton goods. For instance, the throstle employed more energy, less skilled labour and was 
better at spinning coarse yarn than the mule. In consequence, one can argue that the choice 
of product and machinery was intimately connected with the availability of skilled labour 
2 Fisher (1991), p. 151. 
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and relative factor prices in this early period of the factory-based cotton industry. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. In the next section, the main 
characteristics (size, quality-mix and export performance) of these four cotton industries are 
discussed. Section 3 provide an analysis of technological developments in cotton textiles 
during the period. The following section discusses the process of diffusion of the cotton 
textiles' technology in Lancashire, New England, Catalonia and Lombardy. Section 5 
develops a framework to understand how technological choices and quality-mix were 
interrelated and how quality choices were decided by factor endowments and workforce 
skills. Finally, the last section concludes and summarises. 
2. Main characteristics: size, quality-mix and export performance 
For the sake of comparison, it is useful to know how large the cotton industries of 
Catalonia, New England, Britain and Piedmont were. To answer this question, I rely on 
cloth produced more than on spindles or raw cotton import figures. The number of spindles 
is not a good indicator of the size of the cotton industry because the productivity of spindles 
varies strongly with yarn quality (count). Similarly, the level of raw cotton consumption 
does not furnish information on the real amount of production since, for example, wastage 
and the weight of production vary according to yarn quality.3 For the reasons above, my 
choice was to compare cloth produced in square metres. Table 1 shows the results. 
3 See, for example, Blaug (1961), Huberman (1996) or Comisi6n especial arancelaria (1867). 
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1830-40 
1840-50 
1850-60 
1830-60 
Table 1. Production of Cotton Cloth: Catalonia, New England, Britain 
and Piedmont, 1830-1860 (In thousands of m2, average per year) 
Cataloma 
21,291 
51,430 
109,132 
60,500 
New England 
229,440 
414,972 
612,815 
420,345 
Hntam 
680,614 
1,140,804 
1,852,892 
1,233,122 
Piedmont 
9,690 
17,701 
34,165 
20,519 
Notes and sources: Numbers subject to rounding errors. New England's data is drawn from Davis and Stettler 
(1966), table 4, p. 221. The procedure to compute the Catalan and British figures was the following. First, according 
Huberman's (1996) method, a disaggregated yarn output series was constructed for Catalonia and Britain. Then, 
under the assumption that yam exports and yam inventories had the same distribution as yarn production, I derived 
the amount of yam consumed in the weaving industry (the figures on British yam exports are drawn from Ellison 
(1968), table 2). That is, total yam production minus exports of yam, inventories, and wastage (5 percent) during 
weaving. To arrive at output in m2, I multiply the weight of the cloth consumed by a fixed coefficient. The 
coefficients are different for each quality also different for Catalonia and Britain. The Catalan coefficients are 
derived from Comisi6n especial arancelaria (1867) and the British coefficients from the figures on cotton fabrics 
from the Economist (1845). Then I sum across qualities to compute total estimates. Piedmont's figures on raw 
cotton imports were drawn from Quazza (1961), p. 221. After deleting re-exports with coefficcients furnished by 
Castronovo (1965), pp. 282-283, these figures have been transformed into raw cotton consumption. Then, with 
quality figures of table 3 and Catalan weights, I convert raw cotton consumption into m2 of cotton. 
This table immediately reveals that British cotton industry was gigantic when 
compared with its rivals. In particular, on average, it was about three times as large as the 
second largest cotton industry, the New England's. Moreover, in comparison with British's 
or New England's, both the Catalan and the Piedmont cotton industries were minuscule. 
Thus, by the 1850s, the British cotton industry was about seventeen times as large as the 
Catalan cotton industry and about fifty-four times as large as the Piedmont cotton industry. 
Finally, it should be noted that the cotton industry of New England did not progress like the 
cotton industry in Great Britain, Catalonia and Piedmont. 
A common characteristic of these four regions was that they concentrated most of 
the cotton industry of their respective countries. By 1861, Catalonia produced about the 75 
percent of Spanish cotton textiles.4 However, some years before these indices of 
concentration were even higher when Catalonia enjoyed with the de facto monopoly of 
4 Gimenez Guited (1862) gives national figures on cotton industry production. 
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factory-based cotton industry in Spain. Thus, in the 1850s, new factory-based cotton 
industries emerged in the Province of Malaga (Andalusia) and the Basque Country.s Due to 
the political fragmentation and the presence of important trade barriers, Italian cotton 
industry was less concentrated than Spanish's. By the 1850s, Piedmont elaborated about 43 
percent of Italian production but had gradually lost its share in Italian production with the 
emergence of the cotton industry in other regions.6 Thus, other important settlements of 
cotton mills in Italy were in Lombardy, Ligury, Campania, Veneto and Tuscany.7 In 1850, 
New England produced about 67 percent of V.S. cotton textiles.8 It should be noted, 
however, that since the 1820s the development of the cotton industry in the Southern and 
the mid-Atlantic region had reduced the share of New England in V.S. figures.9 In 1856, 
about 68 percent of British employment in cotton mills was in Lancashire. By sharp contrast 
with the other three regions, from 1822 to 1856, Lancashire increased its share in national 
output. 10 
It should be emphasized that the disparities in the quality of cloth among these 
countries were so notable as their differences in size. The next table shows some data on 
this point: 
5 Nadal (1974), pp. 218-225. 
6 Castronovo (1965), p. 284. 
7 A'Heam (1998), p. 736ff. 
8 DeBow (1970), table CXCVI, p. 180. 
9 Harley (1992). 
10 For example, its share in employment in cotton textiles grew from about 55 percent to about 
68 percent. Von Tunzelmann (1978), table 7.18, p. 239. 
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Table 2. Quality Distribution of Cloth Production: 
Catalonia, Lombardy, New England and Britain, 1830-1860 
(in average percent per year) 
Catalonia <20 20-40 40-60 6O-Ao 
1830-40 68.37 31.44 0.10 0.09 
1840-50 25.94 71.89 1.83 0.35 
1850-60 18.06 76.43 4.04 1.47 
1830-60 25.93 70.31 2.77 0.99 
Lombardy <20 20-40 40-60 60-80 
1856 66.73 33.00 0.26 0.01 
New England <16 >18 
1830-40 75.99 24.01 
1840-50 73.44 26.56 
1850-60 76.12 23.88 
1830-60 75.27 24.73 
Britain <20 20-40 40-60 60-80 >80 
1830-40 17.12 45.24 24.16 8.03 5.44 
1840-50 14.82 48.66 27.87 4.44 4.21 
1850-60 8.10 48.79 34.29 4.60 4.22 
1830-60 11.76 48.12 30.55 5.17 4.40 
Notes and sources: Numbers subject to rounding errors. Spanish figures corresponded to Spanish counts and 
British, Lombardy's and New England's to English counts. Therefore, since the Spanish counts were slightly finer 
than the corresponding English counts, Spanish figures understated the quality of the Spanish production. When 
it has been possible, figures are computed as arithmetic averages to avoid cyclical variation in quality due to 
changes in the prices of raw cotton and short-term market adjustments. New England data are drawn from Davis 
and Stettler (1966), table A.2. Note that the New England figures are based on a sample of firms but in the entire 
population. Lombardy's data are drawn from Zanelli (1967), table 42. For sources of the Catalonia and Britain data 
see the previous table 1. 
At first glance, this table suggests that New England and Lombardy produced heavier 
fabrics than Catalonia and Britain.1l For the period as a whole, the quality of the New 
England cloth did not change considerably because about 75 percent of production was 
constantly of the coarsest quality.12 Similarly, in Lombardy about two-thirds of the cotton 
cloth was of that quality. In a sharp contrast, Britain and Catalonia tended to concentrate 
their production in the medium range (counts from 20 to 60). By the 1850s more than three 
11 Unfortunately, quality data for the Piedmont is not already available though Lombardy's figures 
can be considered similar to those of Piedmont. Particularly, many literary testimonies tend to 
support the view that all Italian regions produced low-quality cotton goods. See, for example, 
references appeared at Zamagni (1993), pp. 89ff. 
12 This result is similar to the evidence presented by Temin (1988) for the 1830s. 
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quarters of their production was in these counts thus abandoning the production of the 
heaviest qualities. In Catalonia the sharp decreases in the production of coarse cloth took 
place in the 1840s whereas in Britain in the 1850s. Finally, it should also be noted that 
British industry reduced the share of the finest qualities (over 60 count) although it was the 
country with the largest share of that type of cloth. 13 
Differences in export performance were also important. The weakness of the 
international position of Spanish, Italian and American cotton textiles during this early 
period should be emphasized. The export of cotton textiles from Spain or Italy was 
practically negligible and British exports were about thirty times as great as American 
exports, though Americans were the world's second-largest cotton textile producers.14 On 
balance these three countries imported cotton textiles, mainly from Britain. By direct 
contrast, through the ante-bellum years, British exported about two-thirds of what they 
produce. Nevertheless, as Sandberg previously noted, from 1845 Great Britain has gradually 
lost its share of the world market, being replaced the new European and United States cotton 
industries. IS The next table shows the evolution of cotton textiles exports from Britain 
towards these three countries and the Mediterranean basin. 
Table 3. British Cotton Textile Exports, 1820-1858 
(In thousands of £, average per year) 
MedIterranean bmted 
World Basin States Spain Italy 
1820-29 16,948 3,544 1,825 808 1,422 
1830-39 20,914 4,120 1,874 537 1,710 
1840-49 24,361 5,207 1,359 584 1,537 
1850-58 34,197 5,154 3,263 421 1,881 
Notes and sources: Numbers subject to rounding errors. Figures are in Current values. The data are drawn from 
Mann (1968). Spanish figures include smuggling which has been computed according to the procedures described 
in notes to figure 1. 
13 This sharp drop in the finest qualities can explain the drop in the quality index constructed by 
Sandberg (1968). 
14 Harley (1992), pp. 576-579. 
IS Ellison (1968), pp.97ff. 
8 
Overall cotton exports of Britain grew faster than cotton exports to the United States, 
Italy and Spain. From 1820s to 1850s, total figures on British cotton exports more than 
doubled whereas exports to United States only increased about 78 percent, to Spain 
practically halved and to Italy grew by a mere 32 percent. It is also striking the Spanish and 
Italian experience when compared with the rest of the Mediterranean basin, where British 
exports experienced an abrupt increase. More specifically, in the early 1820s over the 80 
percent of British cotton textiles exports to the Mediterranean basin were concentrated in 
the countries at the Iberian and the Italian peninsulas whereas by the end of 1850s only 
about the 50 percent. 
Interestingly, Sandberg has proposed a quality-related explanation to the persistence 
of British exports in the countries with emerging cotton factory-based industries. According 
to him, Great Britain continued to export high-quality goods to the American and Western 
European markets while very cheap goods went to the rapidly expanding low-income 
markets. 16 Thus, the British cotton industry lost almost of all the markets for coarse and 
medium quality cloth in Europe. Note that the evidence presented in the past table 2 gives 
some support to Sandberg's arguments since American, Spanish and Italian cotton industries 
produced coarser quality than British's. The evident questions are why European producers 
and the United States specialized in relatively low-quality and not in high-quality cloth? and 
why these important differences in quality-mix among Catalonia, Lombardy and New 
England? 
3. Technology in Cotton textiles 
In this section I show that in the pre-cotton famine period several alternative 
technologies were available to entrepreneurs in cotton textiles. 17 Some technologies required 
more power than others, others were suitable for domestic production and others simply not, 
others relied in skilled workforce whereas others were suitable for unskilled labour. Equally 
important are the relation between machinery and the quality of goods because to make each 
16 Sandberg (1968). 
17 This section is based on Ellison (1968), Ure (1836) and Von Tunze1mann (1978). 
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quality only a narrow range of machinery could be used. Consequently, the range of 
'appropriate' technological options were more limited than the large list of machines can 
suggest. 
Both spinning and weavmg machines of the mid-nineteenth century are 
improvements on pioneering machines that date from the Industrial Revolution. Power costs, 
and innovations in power sources, strategically affected these improvements. 18 However, the 
phases of development in fine and coarse spinning showed important differences, both in 
comparison with weaving and between themselves. 
The mid-nineteenth century cotton spmmng machinery is clearly recognizable 
descendant of the two spinning machines invented in the 1760s. The jenny was invented by 
James Hargreaves and the water frame was developed by Richard Arkwright. Hargreaves' 
jenny spun intermittently whereas Arkwright's water frame was based on continuous 
methods of spinning. While the jennies were made of wood and their small size made them 
appropriate for use in domestic units, the water frames were used in large factories. 
However, these two primitive spinning machines proved to be complementary rather than 
competitive because of their wider differences. The water frame was at least five times as 
productive as the jenny but could not produce fine counts; by that, it was used basically for 
the production of warps. On the other hand, yarn from jenny was most suitable for weft but 
this machine suffered a sharp decline in cost-efficiency when used for anything above quite 
coarse counts of yam. In consequence, factory production of warp yam in water frames also 
expanded cottage production of weft yarn in jennies. 
In the following decades, new intermittent spinning machines meant the demise of 
Hargreaves' jenny but not the ruin of continuous methods, which could produce coarse yarn 
faster and cheaper than these new machines. Samuel Crompton invented the mule in 1779. 
This new spinning machine broke through the technical barrier to permit the economical 
spinning of fine yarns by machine methods. The first mules were made of wood and their 
small size made them suitable for use in domestic production. However, by 1790 new large 
18 Von Tunzelmann (1978), pp. 175-240. 
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mules were made of metal, powered by waterwheels and were being used in large factories, 
which were specialized in fine yarns. 19 By the 1830s, the mule was improved by Richard 
Roberts, who invented the self-acting mule. Until this new device appeared, a man's strength 
had been required for pushing the mule spindles back and forth on their carriage. When the 
self-actor removed this requirement, one spinner could now work up to 1200 spindles 
compared with about 300 on a traditional mule. Several constraints limited the universal use 
of self-acting mules: the self-acting mule required more power, more repairs, more 
technicians, and was less flexible (since had greater difficulty of changing quickly from one 
grade of yarn to another) than hand-mules. In effect, until the 1850s, the self-acting could 
only spin yam below the count number 50. Extremely fine yarn was spun on the older hand-
mules into the 1880s. 
The continuous method of spinning was also improved in the first half of the 
nineteenth century. In 1828, John Thorp and Charles Danforh developed independently the 
throstle, a variant of water frame, in the United States.2° This spinning machine 
automatically and continuously performed the drawing, twisting, and winding of yarn. The 
only intervention in the spinning process required from workers in throstles was to piece up 
yams when they broke and to replace bobbins. It should be noted that these tasks could be 
easily learned in few days of training. In a sharp contrast, the self-acting required continuous 
attention from operatives and specific skills.21 By the 1850s, Americans made other 
important improvements in continuous spinning. For example, the development of cap 
spinning and ring spinning allowed continuous spinning to achieve higher speeds than 
before. These primitive ring throstles required very great motive power and were not 
possible to spin yarn of fine grades on it in sufficient quality. Because of these disabilities, 
self-acting mule was not eclipsed by early rings. For example, in the 1860s, only the 
American industry had almost as many ring as mule spindles.22 
19 Von Tunzelmann (1978), p. 224. 
20 The classical account of the American inventions in throstle and ring technology is Cope land 
(1912). See, also, Jeremy (1981). 
21 See, for example, Cohen (1990) and Huberman (1996). 
22 Saxonhouse and Wright (1984), p. 274. 
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At the beginnings, the diffusion of the new machinery in cotton spinning, which 
cheapened the price of yams, expanded handloom weaving. The first serious efforts to 
mechanize the operation of the handloom date back to the attempts of Edmund Cartwright 
in 1787. In 1803, Horrocks patented the first truly workable powerloom. But it was not until 
after 1815 that power-driven machinery (Le., powerlooms) began to interpret more than an 
insignificant role in cotton weaving. As with the mule, the primitive powerloom technology 
was modified over many years, and it was not until the 1850s that weaving by machine 
triumphed over traditional handloom weaving in England. It took considerably longer in 
other countries and textile industries?3 
4. Technological choices 
During the first half of the nineteenth century technological leadership remained in 
the hands of the British cotton industry. As showed above, a great part of the progress in 
cotton technology during the period was due to British engineers.24 Though some European 
regions and after New England made many technological advances, Lancashire supplied all 
or most of the textile machinery to most manufactures in all Europe. The first European 
cotton mills were completely British in design and equipment. Many British skilled workers, 
including women, performed important technical functions in the new factories. For 
example, they provided technical advice and guidance, supervision, management and trained 
local workers in the new technology. According to Bruland (1989), British machinery 
23 The extended co-existence between powerloom and hand loom has led to an intense debate. 
For Von Tunzelmann (1978), some improvements in the application of power to cotton textiles 
production, particularly the adoption of high-pressure steam engines, reduced power costs 
substantially, by that significantly enhancing the profitability of power weaving. Moreover, the 
diffusion of the powerloom was partially interconnected with that of self-acting since this spinning 
machine produce regular yarn such as was required by primitive powerlooms. Instead, for Lyons 
(1987)(1989) the delay in the triumph of mechanized weaving have a different explanation since 
powerlooms were more profitable than handlooms from about 1820. Acco~ding to his view, 
handloom weavers adapted to the misfortunes of technological displacement because they moved to 
areas of rising economic opportunity, had their children earn higher incomes, and maintained family 
cohesion. In other words, to compete with more efficient powerlooms, handloom,weavers squeezed 
their wages. Therefore, it seems that the triumph of powerlooms depended on the relative costs of 
energy and labour. 
24 On the British advances during the period see, for example, Chapman (1987), Von Tunzelmann 
(1978), Ellison (1968), and Mann (1968). 
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suppliers provided to foreign textile firms a complete array of information, equipment, and 
labour. In other words, they provided the 'technological capability' to new cotton factories. 
However, once got this 'technological capability' non-British factories ran by themselves. 
In Britain, at the very beginnings of the nineteenth century, the fine-spinning branch 
was the most technologically advanced because, for example, it was the first in applying 
steam-power to the new textile machinery. These substantial improvements cheapened finer 
yams, which had noticeable effects on both exports and cloth fashion. In particular, British 
cotton firms produced more cheaply than did in India.25 By the 1830s, however, 
technological leadership in cotton spinning moved to the production of coarse yam. 26 
Robert's self-acting mule along with cheaper steam power and refinements in powerlooms 
in the following decade, greatly reduced prices of ordinary cloth. Therefore, by the mid-
nineteenth century, British cotton industry remained organized in two different branches: 
fine and coarse-spinning mills.27 Also, many coarse mills integrated vertically powerloom 
weaving.28 
The first modem spinning machinery (Le., Arkwrights' water frames) appeared in the 
United States during the last years of the eighteenth century.29 The embargo and the war 
with Great Britain had favoured the settlement of the cotton industry in the United States. 
But the first great expansion of the industry took place from the end of the War of 1812, 
when the industry was protected by high tariffs.30 In this early period, American cotton-
textile mills, which were known as the Rhode Island type, were comparable to British coarse 
spinning firms. 
In few years, American practices diverged from British's. American cotton mills 
25 Von Tunzelmann (1978), p. 224. 
26 Von Tunzelmann (1978), pp. 184ff. 
27 GatrelI (1977). 
28 GatrelI (1977) and Lyons (1985). 
29 On the early history of the V.S. cotton industry see, among others, Cohen (1990), David 
(1970), Harley (1992), Jeremy (1981), Nickless (1979), Temin (1988), and Zevin (1971). 
30 Zevin (1971) and Stettler (1977). 
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preferred water instead of power-driven machinery and worked their machines more quickly 
than the British.3) As noted above, American engineers not only run the same British 
machinery at faster speeds but also improved continuous methods of spinning, which 
required more installed power. Perhaps, more interestingly, by the 1820s Americans had 
introduced their own new type of cotton mill: the Waltham-type. They integrated power 
spinning on throstles and powerlooms and a new form of organization of the workforce. 
According to Jeremy, these new mills succeeded in lowering the cost of production for the 
coarsest products.32 However, until the American Civil War, both types of mills survived.33 
Rhode Island type mills and handweavers specialised in the segments of the market where 
fashion and flexibility were more important while the Waltham-type dominated the market 
for standardised products.34 
Catalan cotton industry was older than New England's. The first enterprises devoted 
to printing cotton cloth were established in Barcelona in the late 1720s.35 These calicoes 
were sold in the protected markets of the Peninsula and the Spanish colonies in America.36 
Because for most of the eighteenth century all cotton yam was imported (mainly from 
Malta), as well a large part of the grey cloth consumed, cotton spinning and weaving were 
not important. It took about 60 years for Catalonia to develop cotton spinning. In 1802, the 
new spinning industry was heavily protected since the import of foreign yam and cloth was 
forbidden. Through the thirty years that followed the ban, domestic production and out-
working were common practice in cotton spinning. Thus, cotton spinning tended to remain 
dispersed in the villages and small towns of the Pre-Pyrenees, where they could rely upon 
a good supply of cheap female and child labour, rather than becoming concentrated in the 
calico centre of Barcelona.37 Initially, due to its unskilled workforce and the use of jennies 
31 Montgomery (1840) and Von Tunzelmann (1978), pp. 266ff. 
32 Jeremy (1981). 
33 Cohen (1990). 
34 Harley (1992). 
3S On the history of the cotton industry in Catalonia before 1830 see Thomson (1992), and 
Sanchez (1989). 
36 There is a large debate on the role played by the colonial and home markets in the 
development of Catalan cotton industry. See the review of the literature in Delgado (1995). 
37 Gutierrez (1834)(1837), Sanchez (1989) and Thomson (1992). 
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and water frames, Catalan spinning concentrated on the low grades of yarn (below 20 
count). During the same period, handweavers proliferated in the major Catalan 
manufacturing townS.38 Catalan cotton cloth was also coarse due to the ban on cotton yam 
imports. Nevertheless, skilled handweavers produced a wide range of qualities by using 
other textile fibres such as wool, linen and silk.39 This development of the domestic industry 
was accompanied by the scarce adoption of the steam engine. 
In 1832, the Bonaplata mill introduced the new forms of organisation, the steam 
engine, and the most recent British machinery (e.g., the powerloom).40 In a few years, the 
new machinery was universally employed in cotton spinning and dominated cotton weaving. 
The Catalan industry was characterised during this period by the rapid adoption of 
machinery innovations. For example, Catalan cotton mills made the transition from mule-
jennies to self-actings in only a decade, such that by the 1850s more than 75 percent of 
spindles were moved by self-actors.41 The diffusion of the new machinery paralleled the 
increase in the quality of local production since the average count increased to 30 count 
from about 15 count.42 Moreover, the vertically integrated cotton mills expanded rapidly and 
captured the market for coarse-medium cloth. However, well before the 1860s, some 
horizontal spinning mills and domestic hand-weaving survived by producing for more 
fashion-oriented segments of the market.43 
In the first phases of the adoption of the new machinery, during the 1830s and the 
early 1840s, British and French technicians and workers played a leading role but, by the 
1840s, the foreign workers had been completely substituted in their tasks by local 
technicians. Therefore, after the initial period, Catalans developed the capacity to maintain 
their own machinery, adopted the new technologies and, obviously, ran them without any 
38 Sanchez (1989). 
39 In Roses (1998a), there is a full discussion ofthe skills differences between handspinning and 
handweaving. 
40 Nadal (1974), p. 198. 
41 Ronquillo (1851-1857) and Maluquer de Motes (1976). 
42 Figuerola (1968), and Madoz (1846). 
43 Roses (1998b), chapter 8. 
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foreign help. Through the post-adoption phase, Catalan firms incorporated a stream of 
incremental developments and modifications to improve and adapt foreign technology to 
local requirements.44 For instance, similarly to Americans', they developed their own type 
of centralized, vertically integrated, water-driven cotton spinning and weaving factory: the 
colonia.45 
The cotton industry in the Piedmont was less developed than in the other three 
regions that are considered in this study. 46 During the eighteenth century, several regulations 
and laws protecting wool and silk industries prevented the expansion of cotton textiles. Up 
to the second decade of the nineteenth century, cotton textile firms did not adopted some 
modem spinning machinery (i.e., mule-jennies). In this early period, cotton industry was 
predominantly domestic and rural, employing unskilled workforce. Moreover, capital for this 
early development came from foreign entrepreneurs, mainly Swiss and French. These foreign 
entrepreneurs also introduced technology and production methods of their countries of 
origin. Therefore, most of the Piedmont cotton mills bought almost all their machinery to 
Alsatian and Swiss engineering firms. It should be noted, however, that machines did not 
differ from original British designs.47 By the 1830s, economic policy increasingly benefited 
cotton textiles since the government established high tariffs on cotton imports. As happened 
in Catalonia before 1832, these protective measures increased the production but failed to 
stimulate the adoption of power-driven machinery.48 
Certainly, the turning point in the history of the Piedmont cotton industry was in 
1842. The government of Piedmont reduced drastically tariffs on cotton goods. Contrary to 
the most pessimistic observations, these free-trade measures did not ruin the industry but 
contributed to its modernization since it eased the substitution of factories for small units-of-
44 Roses (1998a). 
45 Carreras (1983) and Nadal (1991) .. 
46 This account of Piedmont cotton industry is based on Quazza (1961) and Castronovo (1965). 
47 See Fisher (1991), pp. 145ff. 
48 Castronovo (1965) argued that, during this early period, coal costs made uninteresting the 
adoption of steam power in cotton textiles. 
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production.49 In addition, by the same year, modem waterwheels and throstles were 
introduced in Piedmont. Only few years later, by the 1850s, several spinning factories 
adopted some self-acting mules. In a sharp contrast, cotton weaving did not show signals 
of modernization. This branch of cotton textiles did not experience any kind of mechanical 
breakout up to the 1870s, when the first powerlooms were used by the new vertically 
integrated cotton spinning and weaving factories. Therefore, up to the 1870s, cotton spinning 
took place in factories whereas domestic system and putting-out predominated in cotton 
weaving.50 
Labour management in the very early factory period was similar in Catalonia, 
Piedmont, Lancashire and New England because all cotton factories combined two forms 
of factory management: sub-contracting and foremanship.51 More specifically, workers in 
the preparatory section and spinners on throstles were supervised by foremen whereas 
spinners on mules were organised into autonomous, sub-contracted work teams. In particular, 
these spinners had functional autonomy because the craft-oriented machinery ran 
intermittently. Thus, they decided the pace of their work, organised their own work teams, 
had the authority to hire and fire assistants, and were paid by piece. 
However, by the 1850s, U. S. practices moved towards a new system of production 
with a workforce mainly formed by females and children controlled by foremen.52 The 
adoption of powerlooms and self-actings in the United States went hand in hand with the 
transition of sub-contracting to foremanship. 53 In Piedmont, where the division-of-Iabour had 
been less important,54 the adoption of throstles and self-actings signified the elimination of 
piece-rate payments among spinners. According to Castronovo, operatives in the Lombardy's 
cotton factories were subject of rigid norms and only foreign technicians and foremen had 
49 CastronoYo (1965), p. 24-25. 
50 CastronoYo (1965), p. 164. 
51 Cohen (1990) on United States, Huberman (1996) and Clark (1994) on England, and Camps 
(1995) and Roses (1998a) on Catalonia. 
52 Cohen (1990). 
53 Cohen (1990), especially chapter 6. 
54 CastronoYo (1965), pp. 222ff. 
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some autonomy.55 By sharp contrast with the United States and Piedmont, the mam 
consequence of diffusion of the self-acting in Catalonia and Britain was the reduction of the 
number of helpers but not the dislocation of craft control from the shop floor. Similarly, it 
seems that Catalan and Lancashire weavers managed to retain their autonomous position in 
production even if the introduction of the powerloom could have increased foremanship 
practices in some weaving factories.56 
The difference in the technological development of the four cotton industries is 
indeed quite starling. We have seen that there are marked differences in the adoption of the 
factory system, labour management, the new machinery, and even in the type of machinery 
preferred. At first glance, American, Spanish and Italian cotton industries employed during 
several decades inferior machinery and techniques than British's. However, by the 1850s, 
this technology gap with Britain had been practically cut by these followers. Then, the 
typical American, Spanish, or Italian cotton mill possessed the same machinery as the most 
modem British cotton mill. Energy costs were partly responsible for this delay in the 
adoption of new machinery, which was more power-intensive. Thus the invention of the 
high-pressure steam engine, which decreased coal costs, might ease the adoption of self-
actings and powerlooms in Spain. 57 However, at this point, many readers can agree that it 
seems difficult to explain the choice of technology only in terms of technological gaps and 
energy costs. 
5. Explaining technological choices 
The discussion thus far suggests that the choices of technology and quality were 
closely connected in cotton textiles before the 'cotton famine'. For instance, American 
producers preferred throstles instead of hand-mules because they produced coarse fabrics. 
Meanwhile, fine spinning mills in Britain never employed throstles and preferred hand-
5S Castronovo (1965), pp. 224-226. 
56 Cohen (1990), pp. 73-74 gives inconclusive evidence on this aspect of the British cotton 
weaving industry. By contrast, Catalan sources such as Comisi6n especial arancelaria (1867) or Cerda 
(1968) clearly stated that weavers were paid by piece during this period. 
57 Von Tunzelmann (1978) relates the adoption of self-actings and powerlooms in England to 
the invention of high-pressure steam engines. 
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mules. Therefore, it can be argued that one can interpret technological choices by explaining 
the final determinants of quality-mix. It should be noted that several alternative explanations 
for quality choices had been advanced in the literature on cotton textiles. 
Sandberg pointed out that it is possible that quality-mix was a consequence of the 
life-cycle of the cotton industry. Young cotton industries produce low quality goods because 
they did not require skilled or experienced labour and there was a large domestic market for 
them.58 Instead, mature cotton industries were able to specialize in high quality cloth as a 
consequence of their skilled labour. However, the same history of the New England cotton 
industry gives little support to this argument because the industry matured but was still 
producing coarse goods. 
It is often maintained that the characteristics and sizes of markets shaped the product 
choice of the cotton industry. For example, Sandberg has argued that only a worldwide 
exporter such as Great Britain was likely to have a large market for high-quality goods.59 
Therefore, according to this line of reasoning, all small countries should only develop the 
production of heavy cloth. The obvious counterexample is the small Swiss cotton industry 
that produced high-quality cotton goods and could successfully compete with Britain in 
some European markets for expensive cloth.60 On the other hand, many authors have argued 
that the cotton mills in the V.S. were biased towards standard and cheap products because 
of the size and income of their home demand.61 Following the same logic, one would expect 
Catalan cotton mills to produce cheap cotton goods since the Spanish home market for 
textiles was poorer and smaller than other European and American markets.62 However, the 
Catalan cotton industry produced more medium-range than cheap goods. Therefore, it seems 
that the size of home market does not by itself furnish a convincing explanation for the 
quality-mix of the cotton industries. It would be more attuned, however, to relate the 
characteristics of the home production to the preferences of the home consumers. According 
58 Sandberg (1968), p. 15. 
59 Sandberg (1968), p. 15. 
60 Dudzik (1987). 
61 See criticism on this argument in Temin (1988). 
62 On the Spanish home market for textiles see Sanchez-Albomoz (1981) and Prados (1983). 
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to this line of reasoning, consumers in the U.S. were more prepared to buy standard products 
than European consumers. However, this argument cannot be verified quantitatively. 
It is sometimes argued that barriers to free trade modify the quality of the local 
production and foreign imports.63 During the nineteenth century, two types of tariffs were 
employed: ad valorem and fixed duties. The ad valorem duties have several relevant 
properties. First, ad valorem duties were higher on cheap rather than expensive goods and, 
therefore, the level of protection was higher for the local production of heavy (low-quality) 
goods.64 Second, it is perfectly clear that, ceteris paribus, countries with higher ad valorem 
duties would exclude from their home markets finer goods than countries with lower 
barriers. Third, increases in ad valorem duties augmented the range of protected goods 
towards fine (expensive) qualities. Finally, the quality range of foreign production excluded 
from the home market rests on the price of local production and the amount of the duty. For 
the same reason, when local costs fell and the duty actually remained constant, both the 
level of protection and the range of goods protected rose. In fixed duties, instead, when local 
costs decreased and the duty was not modified, the level of protection grows but not 
necessarily the range of goods protected by the tariff. 
Several studies have discussed the influence of tariffs on the development of the 
cotton industry in the U.S.65 Through the ante-bellum period, the U.S. tariffs were in ad 
valorem terms. Duties on cotton textiles imports were established in 1789 and changed no 
less than twenty times up to Civil War. The first tariff on cotton goods was relatively lower 
(5 percent ad valorem) and comparable to other manufactured products tariffs. In the period 
from 1790 to 1811, the ad valorem duty grew in successive reforms up to 15 percent. The 
first great reform happened in 1812 when duties were practically doubled (27.5 percent) to 
finance the war. Moreover, in 1816, a law was completed by Congress that established the 
minimum valuation for all pieces of cloth imported into the United States. Note that the 
system of minimum values reinforced the fact that duties rested more on coarse than fine 
cloth. In 1832 the system of minimum values was dropped and rates were generally lowered 
63 See, for example, Sandberg (1968) or Temin (1988). 
64 Sandberg (1968), p. 15. 
6S David (1970), Stettler (1977), Temin (1988), and Harley (1992). 
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although the ad valorem rate was still higher (25 percent). From 1842 to 1846 there was 
another protective bubble and ad valorem rates were increased up to 30 percent. Finally in 
1846 Congress lowered the tariff to 25 percent and eliminated the minimum valuation.66 The 
U.S. tariff had disproportionate effects on the various cotton goods because it gave more 
protection to heavy rather than light cotton cloth. However, Harley has recently shown that 
the level of protection of the industry in the U.S., even after the reform of 1846, was enough 
to protect the production of coarse and medium-range cotton cloth.67 Therefore, the level of 
protection, was so high that it probably had negligible effects on the New England's cotton 
mills choice between coarse and medium products. 
The Spanish cotton industry was protected from 1802 by the ban on cotton yam and 
cloth imports.68 In theory, obviously, the level of protection in Spain was higher than in the 
United States. By the 1840s the scope of the ban was limited to yam below 60 count and 
cloth produced with that type ofyam.69 This modification of the structure of the tariff might 
not have directly affected Spanish production since the domestic industry produce very little 
yam above the 60 count. Therefore, the level of protection was so high that it probably had 
negligible effects on the choice of the Spanish cotton mills between coarse and medium 
products. However, one must be aware that the ban on foreign imports was difficult to 
enforce during these years. As a consequence, smuggled British fabrics reached a large 
portion of the Spanish market.70 
The obvious question is whether changes in the enforcement of the ban can explain 
changes in the choice of quality of the Catalan mills. Specifically, if the movement towards 
the medium range fabrics in the 1840s was caused by an increase in the 'real' level of 
protection (i.e., in the risk of smuggling due to an increase in the repression of the illegal 
trade). Note that the amount of foreign goods illegally imported was a function of the 
66 On tariff history in the cotton industry in the United States see Taussig (1931) and Stettler 
(1977), especially chapter 5. 
67 Rarley (1992), table 2, p. 562. 
68 Nadal (1974). 
69 Ronquillo (1851-1857) and Gimenez Guited (1862). 
70 Prados (1984). 
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margin received by smugglers, the premium risk obtained by consumers, and the risk 
involved in this illegal activity. For example, when the risk increases and the margin 
remains constant smuggling decreases (i.e., the 'real' level of protection and, therefore, the 
market for home industry increases). Moreover, if the risk of smuggling was little or 
unvaried over time, one could expect that, over the long-run, the amount of smuggled goods 
paralleled the margin received by smugglers and was independent of the risk incurred in 
illegal trade. Here, the hypothetical margin of smugglers is easy to compute since the 
premium risk received by consumers in Spain was negligible. The reason for this was that 
Spanish law punished only the smugglers and not the buyer, and the seizure of smuggled 
goods could only take place within the frontier zone. Thus, the margin of smugglers was 
equal to the domestic price of cotton goods minus transport costs and the foreign price of 
those goods. The next figure studies the relationship between the amount of smuggling and 
the margin of smugglers. 
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Figure 1. Smuggling of British Cotton Goods in Spain (in £) and Margin of Smugglers 
(five-year averages) 
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Notes and sources: The value of smuggling has been computed according to the formula proposed by Prados 
(1984). That is, British Smuggling of cotton goods in Spain = 0.2 * Exports to Portugal + 0.8 * Exports to 
Gibraltar. The data on the value of exports to Gibraltar and Portugal is furnished by Mann(1968), table 25. The 
margin of smugglers is defined as the difference between the Spanish and British prices of printing cloth minus 
transport costs divided by British prices. For Spanish and British prices see Roses (1998b), chapter 9. 
If the past figure shows the true trend in smuggling and smugglers' margin, one can 
reasonably infer that the amount of smuggled cotton goods relies on the changes in the price 
gap between home and foreign goods. That is, the ban worked like an ad valorem tariff 
fixed at a (high) rate. In particular, the rapid decrease in the early 1840s of the quantity 
smuggled was due to the decrease in the price gap (margin), not to an increase in the 
repression of the illegal commerce. However, figure 1 must be read and interpreted with 
caution since the data is highly imperfect. First, short-run variations cannot be captured by 
the formula that was used to compute the smuggling of British cotton goods because the 
I 
formula was based in fixed coefficients. Second, the margin has been estimated as the 
difference between the prices of printer cloth in Spain and Britain. But it i~ possible that the 
difference between other types of Spanish and British cotton cloth did not evolve in unison 
with printer cloth. Third, the figure cannot explain why smuggling increased faster during 
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the 1830s. In any case, it seems implausible to link the movement of the Catalan cotton 
industry towards medium range goods with a hypothetical increase in the repression of 
illegal trade. The level of protection grew due to the increase in the efficiency of the local 
production and, therefore, the local improvements were the main reason for the shift of 
production towards medium-range cotton fabrics. 
In Piedmont, duties on cotton textile imports were first established in 1815 and were 
reformed several times up to 1860.71 These tariffs were based on fixed duties for each kind 
of yarn or cloth. Up to 1851, Piedmont tariff policy gave more protection to coarse rather 
than finer cotton goods and to weaving than spinning. The first duties were established in 
1815 and reformed several times in the next years. An important reform happened in 1830 
when duties increased in coarse yarns (below 26 count) to 2 LirelKg, in medium yarns (from 
26 to 49 count) to 1.50 LirelKg, and in fine yarns (up to 50 count) 1 LirelKg Similarly, 
duties on cotton cloth also grew and were fixed from a minimum of about 4 LirelKg in grey 
cloth to a maximum of 5-5.5 LirelKg in printed cloth. In 1842 the system of fixed duties 
was dropped and rates were generally lowered although the effective protection was still 
higher.72 For instance, the common price oflocal yarns of the 8 count was about 2.5 LirelKg 
whereas the price of the imported British yarn, incluiding duties, arrived to about 2.8 
LirelKg (that is; 1.94 Lire plus 0.9 Lire of duty).73 Finally in 1851 Cavour lowered the 
tariffs and signed a free-trade agreement with Belgium, a major producer of cotton textiles. 
Moreover, the structure of duties was modified imposing the higher duties on the fine 
qualities. After these reforms, duties on yarn were fixed from a minimum of 0.2 LirelKg in 
coarse yarn to a maximum of 0.6 LirelKg in fine yarn while duties on cloth were fixed from 
a minimum of 0.75 LirelKg in grey cloth to a maximum of 1.5 LirelKg in printed cloth. In 
spite of these reforms, the level of protection of the industry in Piedmont was enough to 
71 On Piedmont's duties see Castronovo (1965), pp. 305-312. 
72 New duties were 0.9 LirelKg in coarse yarn, 2 LirelKg in grey cloth, 0.75 LirelKg in fine 
yam, and 2.5-4 LirelKg in printed cloth. 
73 These prices are drawn from Castronovo (1965), pp. 249-250. British prices were prices at the 
Port of Genoa; thereby they comprised transport and insurance costs. 
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preserve the home production of coarse and medium-range cotton yarn.74 Likewise, duties 
on cloth were so high that foreign cloth encountered many problems in Piedmont markets.75 
Consequently, the leyel of protection was so intense that it presumably had insignificant 
effects on the Piedmont's cotton firms option between coarse and medium products. 
It should be also considered that tariffs were endogenously, not exogenously, 
determined. In other words, the government did not establish duties independently from the 
pressures of local groups. Spain and Italy furnished many examples of duties influenced by 
local industrialists. In Spain, when the ban on foreign cotton imports was reformed in the 
1840s, the employers' organization (the Junta de Fabricas de Catalufia) showed little 
opposition to reduce the ban to yam up 60 count. The reason was that local spinners 
produced little yam above 60 count and mixed-fabrics weavers needed this type of yarn.76 
Similarly, in Piedmont, Ligury weavers, specialized in fine cloth, promoted lower tariffs on 
fine yarn because the scarce local production of that good.77 Moreover, protection on cloth 
was higher than on yam because the numerous handweavers could exert strong pressure on 
successive governments.78 To sum up, one can argue that some cotton goods received more 
protection than others simply because they were produced by the local industry. In 
consequence, duties were not established to modify the quality of home production. 
The three interpretations traditionally advanced in the literature have to be rejected. 
Neither the life-cycle of the industry, nor home market characteristics, nor barriers to free 
trade provide a sufficient explanation of the quality-mix of the three cotton industries 
summarised in table 2. 
74 After 1852, the price of Piedmont yam of 8 count was about 2 Lire/kg whereas the price of 
the same British yam, incluiding duties, in Genoa was about 2.2 LirelKg. Similarly, the price oflocal 
yam of 30 count was about 2.8 LirelKg while the price of the same British yam, incluiding duties, 
in Genoa was about 2.9 LirelKg All prices are drawn from Castronovo (1965), pp. 249-250, except 
of the price of the British yam of 30 count which has been extrapolated from the data on Milan of 
Zanelli (1967), table 15, p. 94. 
75 For example, the duty represented about 30-40 percent of the home price of grey cloth. The 
prices and duties are drawn from Castronovo (1965), pp. 295-296 and 310. 
76 Comisi6n especial arancelaria (1867). 
77 Castronovo (1965), p. 302. 
78 Castronovo (1965), pp. 305ff. 
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Anyone who attempts to analyse the choice among different cloth qualities is 
immediately confronted with the fact that the combination of inputs changes through the 
quality range. As mentioned above, a different combination of energy, raw cotton, labour, 
and human and physical capital was employed to produce each quality of cloth. Therefore, 
it should be relatively straightforward to relate product-mix with factor endowments. 
Figure 2 and table 4 illustrate the costs of producing the different qualities of cotton 
cloth from the point of view of the Catalan manufacturers. The figure practically covers the 
entire universe of Catalan production of cotton cloth and can be considered representative 
of the state-of-the-art of the industry at the end of the 1850s. A major objection, however, 
might be raised against this cost figure. It is impossible to assess the importance of 
labourforce skills and machinery alternatives in the production of the different qualities since 
the two factories considered could produce the whole range of yarn and cloth. 
26 
Figure 2. Producing Costs of Cotton Cloth: Barcelona, 1860 
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Notes and sources: Count refers to the count of yam used in produced the cloth. The source is Comisi6n especial 
arancelaria (1867). The figures are drawn from the answer ofthe Espafia Industrial S.A.The cost of weaving in the 
quality 20&30 and 50&60 has been estimated. The cost of yam in 15&18 counts is drawn from the answer of Jose 
Ferrer & Cia. This last figure has been modified to eliminate the transport costs of raw cotton and other materials 
from Barcelona to Vilanova, where this second firm was settled. Note that cotton comprises the wastage. Energy 
comprises not only coal for light and power but also other minor raw materials. Labour includes all labour cost 
even those outside the shop floor. Finally, capital costs comprise depreciation, profits and capital taxes. 
The past figure shows that the production cost of cloth grew at different rates at each 
point; that is, the cost-quality relation was not a straight-line.79 Interestingly, the increase in 
total costs is more important in the transition from the medium to finest qualities than in the 
transition from coarsest to medium qualities. For example, the cost of producing one m2 of 
coarse fabric (15 & 18 count) was about Rv 2.40. Whereas the cost of producing one m2 
of medium range fabrics (30 & 40 count) was about Rv 2.56 (Le., only about 6.6 percent 
more). More specifically, raw cotton costs per m2 decreased throughout the spectrum of 
coarse-medium qualities, although wastage increases with count. In the fine qualities, 
particularly above 60 count, the raw cotton costs grew again due to the use of large staple 
79 This result invalidates the argument ofBils (1984) on the straight-line relation between costs 
and quality in cotton cloth. 
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and, therefore, expensive fibre. On the other hand, labour, capital and energy costs rose with 
count increases. 
Table 4. Share of Inputs in Total Costs of Cotton Cloth: Barcelona, 1860 (percent) 
Entreiinos Finos Finos Pinos 
Gruesos Medios Entrefinos Tupidos Medios Claros 
Yarn Count 15 &18 20 & 30 30 & 40 40 & 50 50 & 60 70 & 90 
Cotton 53.41 47.00 38.51 27.70 18.98 18.31 
Energy 8.94 10.10 11.76 13.77 15.21 15.58 
Labour 24.39 27.84 31.26 37.37 42.92 42.16 
Capital 13.25 15.06 18.47 21.16 22.90 23.95 
Notes and sources: See the previous figure 2. 
Table 4 displays the fact that the share of different inputs in total costs varied 
according to quality. Thus, the coarsest quality was the most raw-materials intensive and less 
labour-intensive, whereas the opposite holds for finest qualities. Note that the two factories 
in the sample could produce the whole range of goods given their stocks of human and 
physical capital.80 For that reason, the ratios of capital to labour and energy to labour are 
rather constant. Although, they actually produced more medium quality than other types of 
cloth (e.g., the share of medium-quality cloth in the production of Espaiia Industrial S.A. 
was about 80 percent of the total). In other words, it seems that they were better prepared, 
given their stock of physical and human capital, to produce medium-range goods. 
Figures for the whole Catalan cotton industry would probably diverge by some 
amount from the sample figures. Thus, firms specialised in the coarsest qualities used 
throstles instead of self-acting mules and, therefore, operated with relatively more capital 
and energy per worker than the sample firms. Conversely, cotton mills specialised in the 
finest qualities used mule-jennies instead of self-acting mules and employed less capital and 
energy per worker.81 In a few words, the figures presented above presumably overstate the 
share of labour in the cost of coarse qualities whereas the contrary holds for finest qualities. 
80 They used steam-powered self-actings and powerlooms and organised their workforce into 
work-teams, as was typical in Catalan cotton firms. 
81 VonTunzelmann (1978), table 7.3, p. 185 demonstrates this for Lancashire. See also Gattrell 
(1977). 
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Manufacturers in Catalonia were constraint by the price they had to pay for raw 
cotton and for coal, which was primarily influenced by geological and geographical factors. 82 
The problem was alleviated by producing more fine cloth, which was less raw-materials 
intensive than coarse cloth. Thus, the efficient firm on the frontier of the local best-practice 
tried to produce cloth as fine as was possible with the level of skills of its workforce. The 
more skilled was their workforce, the finer was the production, and the high cost of raw 
materials was less important. In other words, cotton mills with less skilled labour specialised 
in products in which the inferiority of their workforce had relatively little impact on the final 
price (i.e., in coarse cloth) whereas cotton mills with a highly skilled labourforce did exactly 
the opposite. The constraint on this movement towards fine cloth in Catalonia was the 
efficiency of the local labourforce because the finest qualities were generally beyond the 
abilities of the Catalan labourforce.83 However, it is not clear whether one should speak 
about the human capital constraint or the climatic constraint. The fact is that the thread 
breakages varied with the count level (high counts broke more often than coarse counts) and 
the dampness of the climate. Because Catalonia is less damp than Lancashire it is clear that 
thread tended to break more often in the former than the latter. For instance, during the 
summer, many spinning firms were at standstill in Catalonia due to the low levels of 
dampness.84 In this segment of the market, the Spanish workforce could not compete with 
British products. 
Differences in the workforce skills facing the four countries at the time Give strong 
support to the arguments advanced in the previous paragraph. During the first half of the 
nineteenth century, in Britain and Catalonia workers were employed in different positions 
according to their skills. In hand and self-acting mules workers were skilled whereas in 
82 In Roses (1998b) costs differentials among Catalan, British and V.S. cotton mills are fully 
discussed. On average, raw cotton prices in Barcelona were 47 percent higher than in New York and 
28 percent higher than in Liverpool. Similarly, the price of coal in the Port of Barcelona was about 
76 percent higher than in Britain. 
83 Contemporary and recent studies stressed the importance of human capital formation in 
determining the level of workers efficiency in early cotton industry. See, for example, Boot (1995) 
and Roses (l998a). 
84 See Famie (1979) and the contemporary, Ferrer Vidal (1875). 
29 
throstles and preparatory machines workers were unskilled. Thus, in the production of coarse 
yarn workers were unskilled whereas the contrary holds for the finest qualities. Instead, the 
V.S. and Piedmont mills used self-acting mules and throstles, and unskilled labourforce to 
produce coarse cotton cloth. In particular, a contemporary described the situation of the 
cotton factories in Italy with the following words: 'when a factory is unable to specialize in 
its working, then fewer, low-quality goods are produced, since it is forced to use what could 
be called generic machinery ... and has generic workers as well'.85 
6. Conclusions 
Despite the fact that the data reported on the previous pages have their limitations, 
one can argue that they provide an explanation for the technical choice and quality-mix of 
the Catalan cotton firms and, by extension, of the Piedmont, British and V.S. cotton mills. 
On average, Catalan cotton mills produced cloth that was in the middle of the extreme 
choices; the unskilled and raw-materials intensive production of the coarse-cloth New 
England mills, and the skills-intensive and raw-materials saving choice of the fine-spinning 
Lancashire cotton mills. Therefore, one can argue that it is likely that Catalonia had a scarce 
supply of raw materials, but that her labour force was on average more skilled than the V.S. 
but less than in Britain. Piedmont cotton mills, with similar raw-materials restrictions than 
Catalan's, produced slightly finer cloth than V.S. cotton mills. However, these cotton mills 
could not produce so fine as Catalan or British cotton mills due to their unskilled workforce. 
Thus, there is strong evidence that the efficiency of labour, which is mainly result of prior 
human capital accumulation, is important in determining the drift of best-practice technology 
in cotton textiles. 
The other components of the quality choice must, however, be allowed their due. 
Plant and equipment costs were higher in Spain, Italy and the V.S. compared to Britain. This 
by itself lowered their optimal quality because it raised their relative operating speeds. 
Labour costs were higher in the V.S. and lower in Spain and Italy. In isolation this would 
have had the effects actually observed, lower quality in the former than in the latter. These 
85 Ellena cited by Zamagni (1993), p 89. 
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aspects along with the particular characteristics of the consumers' choices are not perfectly 
disentangled. 
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